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Connally Amendment

The editorial page of the April 22 issue
of The Tablet (Catholic weekly for the
Archdiocese of Brooklyn) contains a
strong plea in favor of retaining the Connally Amendment. According to the editorial, the new president of the Court is a
representative of Communist Poland. To
add flavor to the news, a new judge on the
fifteen-member panel is a Soviet representative. The new Polish Chief Judge, Bohdahn
Winiarski, is seventy-seven years old, and
after serving the non-Communist Polish
government in exile during World War II,
found it possible to make an accommodation with the Communists when they took
over Poland at the end of the war. He was
regarded by them as sufficiently reliable
politically to merit appointment to the
Court in 1946.
The new Soviet judge, Vladimir Koretsky, is seventy-one years old and has served
the Communist regime in various important
capacities as a legal adviser to Soviet diplomatic missions. His background assures
that he would view the Court as another
apparatus for the realization of Soviet aims
in the war against civilization.
The point which The Tablet makes is
that it is to judges of this stripe that the
Connally repeal forces would entrust the
concerns of the United States, indifferent
to the fact that judges from monolithic governments act as agents of the state and
make no pretense of being unbiased. Their

decisions are made before trials commence.
Only a completely naive person would
imagine that Communist judges would'ever
act outside Communist ideology, or pass up
an opportunity to use the Court to advance
Communist interests or to embarrass the
United States.
On the other hand, the arguments in
favor of repeal continue to multiply. John
C. Satterfield, in an article entitled, "The
Connally Amendment - A Detriment to
the United States," which appears in the
March issue of the Mississippi Law Journal, anticipates the aforementioned Tablet
objection by pointing out that it is hardly
feasible that the Communist countries will
gain control of the Court, when one understands the structure of the Court. There
-are fifteen judges. At present, there are
two judges from Communist countries. This
is a long way from controlling the Court.
Furthermore, we need not fear that change
in the control of the Court will hurt us. We
have a right to withdraw from the Court
upon six months notice. The fifteen judges
hold office for nine years. Their terms are
rotated so that five judges are elected every
three years. Consequently, in order to alter
the majority, a period of six years is necessary. Should the membership of the Court
assume a political aspect or be threatened
by Communist control, we could exercise
our right of withdrawal.
The article concludes by stating in part:
If the Connally Amendment is repealed,
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we will be free in many instances to appeal
to the World Court when other countries
flaunt our rights by denying the rights of
our citizens, and confiscating our property
without a proper legal basis. At present, we
are crippled by the "reciprocity" clauses.
These clauses enable any defendant in a
suit by the United States to invoke the same
veto against us. The amendment, therefore,
has a multiple effect, in that every country
has this Connally Amendment veto right
against us, when we are the plaintiff nation.
It does not matter that we have never used
the Security Council veto, nor that we intend to continue to exercise the utmost
restraint in its use. Others may use it arbitrarily against us. The result is, then, that
the Court will lack jurisdiction and we will
be out of court. If normal diplomatic channels have failed to solve the problem, we are
left with the choice of threatening force or
accepting the particular injustice. This is
usually the situation, for a nation does not
go to the expense of appealing to the World
Court without first attempting to solve the
problem through normal diplomatic means.
Abortion and the Law
Early in March the New Hampshire
House of Representatives, 209 to 156,
passed a bill allowing doctors, under certain conditions, to halt pregnancies during
the first 20 weeks of fetal life. The bill,
strongly opposed by Catholic Bishop
Ernest J. Primeau of Manchester, was supported by the State Medical Association,
the Manchester Ministers' Association and
the New Hampshire Council of Churches.
It is distressing to see staid New Hampshire heading toward a relaxation of
statutes on therapeutic abortion at a time
when, as Bishop Primeau noted, "leading
medical authorities have all but ruled out"
the destruction of fetal life as a "medically
indicated" treatment of the complications
that sometimes arise during pregnancy.
The March 25 issue of America contains

an excellent comment on this turn of events
in New Hampshire. In the judgment of the
editors of America the broad area of human life and its sanctities-is a field in which
the ethical judgment of the churches upon
society is morally imperative. Of what
value are increased church membership
and interest in religion, if they go hand in
hand with a rejection of our traditional
abhorrence of such practices as abortion,
sterilization and euthanasia?
If the churches do not guard morality
in a democratic state, the determination of
morality tends to go by default to the
majority vote and the popular will. If the
pulpits are silent, people look more and
more to the government to define right and
wrong. After all, it is natural for simple
folk to identify moral judgment on abortion, etc., with the penal statutes that cover
these matters. In such situations, the repeal
or relaxation of penal provisions takes on
the appearance of a toleration or even a
societal approval of what was previously
prohibited.
Psychiatry and the Law
Readers who were interested in the recent two part symposium in The Catholic
Lawyer dealing with Mental Disease and
Criminal Responsibility, will enjoy the excellent article by Professor Erickson,
"Psychiatry and the Law: An Attempt at
Synthesis" in the Winter 1961 issue ot the
Duke Law Journal.
As a prelude to synthesis the writer
points out that the law is based upon the
assumption that free will exists. It allows

for certain exceptions-for example, insane
and other mentally diseased persons-but
other than these exceptions, wrongdoers
are held responsible for their acts because
it is assured that they have the ability to
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do right if they so desire. Most psychiatrists
would maintain that this is not so, for acts
are predetermined, so they claim, and the
concept of "responsibility" is not scientifically meaningful. From this (and here is
where the ranks of psychiatry begin to
diverge more), some conclude that the use
of punishment is both illogical and fruitless,
either as a means of individual treatment
or as a means of general deterrence, and
that the only meaningful approach to
criminality lies in the use of psychotherapy,
which will bring about a change in the
(usually unconscious) factors that have influenced the person in such a way that he
has committed a crime.
When one considers the extreme disparity between the "deterministic" and
"free will" interpretations of man's behavior, it becomes somewhat puzzling that
there has been any rapprochement whatsoever between psychiatry and the law. The
explanation for the degree of rapport that
exists would seem to be that only a few
psychiatrists really take psychology and its
branches seriously as far as their practical
relations in everyday life and the functioning of the criminal law are concerned.
Even such extreme advocates of the
"psychiatric position" as Franz Alexander
and Gregory Zilboorg would probably
hesitate to say that there is no advantage
whatever in holding anyone morally responsible for anything. The majority of
forensic psychiatrists, regardless of what
they might proclaim as their theoretical
position on the question of determinism,
have behaved in their relationships with
the law as if they considered the "normal"
individual to be morally responsible and,
therefore, accountable for his acts. Their
major contention with the law has not been
over whether or not it is possible to attach
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moral responsibility to anyone at all, but
over the criteria to be used in determining
who should be held responsible for his
acts and who should not. In fact, some are
quite insistent upon the necessity for sidestepping the whole issue and thereby ignore
the fact that regardless of what they say,
the functioning of psychiatry is based upon
the assumption of determinism.
Having established the points of fundamental divergence the Professor begins his
synthesis by arguing that a realistic appraisal of the nature of man and his relationship to his society necessitates accepting that in order for man to live in a
relatively harmonious state, it is mandatory
that he entertain certain beliefs about himself and his institutions that are not scientifically demonstrable. A more effective system of criminal law cannot be based upon
a philosophy that ignores this, nor can it
ignore the fact that one of its major functions is the control of the noncriminal
majority in the population. If the sole function of the criminal law were the future
deterrence of individuals who have already
committed criminal acts and have fallen
into the hands of the law, the difficulties
involved in prescribing the optimum
methods to be utilized would be greatly
reduced. Such, unfortunately, is not the
case. Even if it is agreed that the proper
end of the criminal law is the utilitarian
function of preventing crime, it would appear that one of the factors necessary for
accomplishing this is the ascription of personal moral responsibility for our actions,
involving the threat of punishment for each
and every one of us should we behave in
an unacceptable way.
The interesting conclusion that the
article arrives at is that our concept of
guilt has inherent in it the concept of re-
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sponsibility for one's acts, and it is of importance to determine whether the individual in question was or was not a free
moral agent capable of controlling his behavior; for however erroneous belief in this
concept of free choice may be, it is a
concept that must be retained if we are to
be maximally influenced by moral and
ethical considerations. To maintain that it
makes no difference whether we incarcerate
a man for a criminal act or commit him to
an institution as a sick individual is to overlook the extremely important effects that
such a straightforward utilitarian philosophy would have upon the population as a
whole. Perhaps for the psychiatrist, the individual's social dangerousness and not his
moral blameworthiness is the essential
criterion in administering the criminal law,
but this is by no means true for the majority of people. For them, the moral blameworthiness of the accused person is a factor
of extreme relevance.
In the words of Professor Erickson:
We must believe in personal responsibility and free will if the law is to function;

all that is required of the law is that it allow
us to be consistent with our beliefs by not
punishing persons who are so extremely and
obviously deranged that they are clearly not

capable of exercising their free will. What is
required is some specified criteria for establishing the degree of derangement that is to
be considered obvious and extreme ...
[W]e have in the Model Penal Code an
approach that will accomplish essentially
what the M'Naghten Rules accomplish, the
excusing from criminal responsibility of a
small percentage of extremely deviant indi-

viduals whose condemnation and punishment would prove disturbing to us because
they are manifestly not the same as the rest
of us. The major difference is that the
Model Penal Code appears to be more in
harmony with current knowledge concerning cognition and conation and their rela-

tionships to overt behavior, thus satisfying
our need for an approach that is not so
anachronistic as that based upon the
M'Naghten Rules.
Right To Work Laws
Although the last word has long ago
been said on this subject in the pages of
The Catholic Lawyer, other publications
continue to discuss the matter with unending vigor. James Youngdahl reviews the
state of the law in Arkansas after thirteen
years of a "Right to Work" law in the Fall,
1960 issue of the Arkansas Law Review.
After a detailed analysis of the cases
interpreting the Arkansas legislation in the
last decade, the author concludes:
As suggested in the Introduction, most
"conclusions" about the Arkansas right to
work law are expressed in terms of economic bias ...
There are some economic observations
which might be helpful for judgment on
the effectiveness of these measures in
Arkansas. It has been demonstrated that
work stoppages due to labor disputes have
occurred with about the same frequency
in the years after 1947 as during a comparable prior period. There is little or no
evidence that right to work laws have appreciably increased industrialization; of
the ten states which led the nation in increased industry between 1939 and 1953,
only two, Texas and Florida, were right
to work states.
In 1929 the annual Arkansas per capita
income was $304, and by 1945 it had
risen to $654. In 1950 it was $805 and
had risen to $1322 by 1959. Thus in the
past thirty years the rise in per capita income appears to be about constant through
right to work and non-right to work years.
In general, it appears that right to work
states have substantially inferior incomes.
Out of forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia, Arkansas in 1959 was next to
the last in per capita income rankings. Under some other standards, right to work
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states have relatively less social legislation
and higher rejection rates for failure of
army education tests.
Whether all of these factors are coincidental or consequent to right to work legislation must be left up to the advocates, but it
does appear that extravagant claims for their
economic value to the state are somewhat
exaggerated.
As to direct legal consequences, no prosecutions under the penalty provisions of the
statute are on record. On the contrary, the
law has been "enforced" through injunctions against picket lines with what are characterized as illegal purposes, or defenses to
contract actions with what are held to be
invalid union security clauses. The major
problems on constitutionality have been resolved, but there appear to be two serious
questions on the scope and enforcement of
the statute under the federal constitution
which have not been presented to the Arkansas courts.
The controversy over union security, or
the right to work, will continue. It is hoped
that the preceding survey of its operation in
Arkansas will be of some value in measuring
its success in the public and legislative debates to come.
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erty as an institution to the individual's
right to a particular piece of property.
Hence the natural law of common use, the
right all men have to the use of earthly
goods, though it is pre-eminent, was relegated to second place. The hierarchy of
means and end was subverted, and the
"sanctity of justly acquired property
rights" became the earmark of Catholic
social ethics.
The author concludes:
The institution of private property - subordinate to co mmon use - does belong to the
unchangeable natural law. But the concrete
expression of an individual's right to property belongs to the changeable natural law
and hence is subordinate to positive law. The
right to define concrete, private rights to
property belongs to the community and, in
the last analysis, to the state. Hence the redistribution of property cannot be rejected
a priori on the grounds of the "inviolability"
of existing property rights - as if private
property did not exist simply for the sake
of the common good.
Capital Punishment

Right to Property
The Winter, 1961 issue of Theology
Digest features a scholarly, well reasoned
note dealing with private property and
raising the question as to whether it is an
absolute right. Written by Franz Kluber,
it argues that seventy years ago Leo XIII
countered Marxism's attack on private
property with the doctrine that private
property is man's by natural right. Catholic
moralists and ethicians promptly took up
the banner; and they are still carrying it in the wrong direction.
According to Kluber, they gave first
place to the subordinate right, the right to
private property. Sometimes they even
transferred the inviolability of private prop-

Readers of the recent symposium on
Punishment will appreciate Professor Orville Snyder's article on "Capital Punishment: The Moral Issue," featured in the
February, 1961, 'West Virginia Law Review.
Professor Snyder poses the moral issue
as being dependent upon evidence. If the
evidence supported a firm conclusion that,
because of its deterrent effect, capital punishment protects the community better than
its alternatives, we could say confidently
that the penalty is morally justified. Also,
if the evidence supported a firm conclusion
that, notwithstanding the deterrent effect it
does have, capital punishment does not
protect the community as well as its alter-
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natives, we could say confidently that the
penalty is morally unjustified. He observes,
however, that evidence supports neither of
these conclusions.
In such a situation he concludes, the
principle to be applied is derived from our
concept of the moral-law basis of government's just powers and of the nature and
measure of these powers. It is that the public safety takes precedence. The application of this principle resolves the doubts in
favor of protecting the community. In safeguarding the community, it would, of
course, be morally wrong to ride roughshod
over the legitimate interests of harm-doers.
However, resolving the doubts about which
of alternative ways of dealing with them better protects the community in favor of the
community, instead of in favor of the harmdoer, in cases of the grave harms listed
above, infringes unjustifiably no interest of
the criminal which is legitimate either constitutionally or morally. Consequently, the
adoption or retention of capital punishment
is morally justified.
Censorship
Readers who recall the 1958 Catholic
Lawyer symposium on censorship will find
new observations and conclusions on the
subject set forth in the November 1960
issue of the Minnesota Law Review. In
this issue, Dean William B. Lockhart and
Professor Robert C. McClure, the "outstanding authorities on obscenity" (as they
were titled by Mr. Justice Douglas in Roth
v. United States) again demonstrate that
their expertise is to be found in their
scholarly resolution of the problems of
liberty and authority posed by obscenity
censorship. After examining the turn that
constitutional protection of literature has
taken since 1957, they point the way to a

practical resolution of the problem" by
formulating constitutional standards which
comport favorably with the approach to
"obscenity" problems taken by the United
States Supreme Court.
In considering the development of a test
to identify "censorable obscenity," they
examine the nature of pornography and
conclude that it provides a useful guide.
They find that "hard-core pornography" is
the foundation for the "constant" concept
of obscenity currently applied by the Court;
and they advocate a "variable" concept
which would make the validity of censorship depend upon the particular material's
primary audience and upon the nature of
the appeal to that-audience.
The authors also discuss: ( 1 ) the requirement that material be judged as a whole
on the basis of its dominant theme; (2) the
weight to be given "redeeming social importance"; (3) the protection of "immoral"
ideas and the "end of ideological obscenity"; (4) the requirement of scienter; (5)
the meaning and application of "contemporary community standards" and (6) the
need for independent judicial review of obscenity findings.
The authors conclude with the following
pertinent observations:
In the past three years the Supreme Court
has made substantial progress toward developing constitutional standards for obscenity
censorship, but difficult problems must still
be faced. The Court has made it quite clear,
both in words and in deeds, that constitutional freedom of expression applies to literature, art, and scientific works dealing with
sex. It has established several significant
constitutional limitations on obscenity censorship, all designed to prevent serious inroads on freedom in this area, though the
full scope of these limitations has yet to be
charted by the Court. But the Court has not
yet struggled in its opinions with the core
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problem of obscenity censorship - how to
draw the line between constitutionally protected material dealing with sex and material
properly censorable as "obscene." It has thus
far made no effort to clarify the brief, inadequate, and somewhat misleading RothAlberts verbal formulation relating to this
core problem.
It is important for the Supreme Court to
give guidance to the lower courts on this
core problem of obscenity censorship, but
we do not criticize the Court for its delay
thus far. On the contrary, we believe the
Court has been wise to avoid an attempt in
these first few years to verbalize the basis
for its conclusions that obscenity findings in
several cases violated constitutional requirements. The Court is charting a new course
here, and it is far more likely to chart a true
course that will avoid dangerous shoals in
the future if it gains substantial experience
in dealing with the difficult cases before it
makes any effort to generalize its constitutional standards for obscenity through a
verbal formulation. But soon it will have to
formulate guide lines for the lower courts.
When that time comes, we hope that our
analysis will prove useful to counsel and to
the Court.
Eichmann Trial
As this issue of The Catholic Lawyer
goes to press, the trial of the notorious
Adolph Eichmann has begun in Israel.
Readers who would be interested in a well
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documented discussion of the moral aspects
of this case are referred to a lengthy article
by Helen Silving, entitled "In Re Eichmann: A Dilemma of Law and Morality,"
in the April, 1961, American Journalof InternationalLaw.
Along the same lines, but on a broader
topic, in an article written in the March,
1961 issue of the American Bar Association Journal, Nicholas R. Doman undertakes to answer contentions that there was
no existing international law to properly
penalize the defendants in the Nuremberg
Trials. Much of what he writes is in direct
refutation of Dr. August von Knieriem's
claims made in his recent book entitled
"The Nuremberg Trials."
Dr. von Knieriem's prime contentions
which Mr. Doman refutes are: (1) There
was no law in force in Germany, international or otherwise, penalizing many of the
acts charged against the German defendants
at the time these acts were committed. (2)
Persons charged with war crimes should
have been tried under their national law.
(3) Individuals are not subject to international law and may not be punished thereunder for any crime by any international
tribunal. (4) An order from a superior authority may confer immunity on the actor.

